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Duress occurs when one person (the defendant) brings improper pressure
to bear on another (the plaintiff) to make them agree to do something.
The pressure may take the form of a threat to do some act or the doing
of the act itself. This paper is concerned with the application of the
doctrine of duress to set aside contracts. In particular, it considers what
I call the 'contractual variation situation'. This is where the plaintiff
claims that they agreed to a variation of an existing contract with the
defendant under duress and the plaintiff seeks to have the variation
set aside. Typically the claim involves the defendant's use of economic
pressure, in particular the threat not to perform the original contract, to
'encourage' the plaintiff to agree to the variation.
The potential application of the doctrine of duress to economic
pressures generally and to the exercise of pressure in the contractual
variation situation gained prominence in the mid 1970s with cases
such as The 'Siboen'and the 'Sibotre'.' Since then a number of key cases 2
and associated academic commentary3 have encouraged debate and
the doctrine of duress is now recognised as an important factor in
determining the validity of contractual variations.I
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Otago. I was privileged
to receive valuable comments on earlier drafts of this article from the late
Richard Sutton, Emeritus Professor.
Occidental Worldwide Investment Corp v Skibs A/s Avanti [1976] 1 Lloyd's
Rep 293.
2 These include Pao On v Lau Yiu Long [1980] AC 614; Universe Tankships
Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers Federation (The'Universe'
Sentinel') [1983] 1 AC 366; Dimskal Shipping Co SA v International Transport
Workers Federation (The 'Evia Luck') [1992] 2 AC 152; CTN Cash and Carry
Ltd v Gallaher Ltd [1994] 4 All ER 714; Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v Attorney-
General CA198/03, 16 August 2004; McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd [2009]
NZCA 329, [2010] 1 NZLR 463.
These include: M H Ogilvie "Economic Duress, Inequality of Bargaining
Power and Threatened Breach of Contract" (1981) 26 McGill LJ 289; J
Beatson "Duress, Restitution, and Contract Renegotiation" in J Beatson The
Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford, 1991) 95 ("Beatson, Duress");
A Phang "Economic Duress - Uncertainty Confirmed" (1992) 5 JCL 147;
S Smith "Contracting Under Pressure: A Theory of Duress" (1997) 56 CLJ
343; R Bigwood Exploitative Contracts (Oxford, 2003). There is also some
important earlier commentary, including: J Dawson "Economic Duress
- An Essay in Perspective" (1947) 45 Michigan LR 253; R Sutton "Duress
by Threatened Breach of Contract" (1974) 20 McGill LJ 254.
Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1; Antons
Trawling Co Ltd v Smith [2003] 2 NZLR 23 (CA).
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Despite the importance of the doctrine, it is unclear just what the
plaintiff must establish to be freed from the ordinary legal consequences
of entering into a contract. A cause of this is that, apart from the results
in individual cases, English and New Zealand courts have chosen to
provide guidance at a high level of generality through statements of
principle as to what constitutes duress.
Adding to the uncertainty, in purporting to apply the principle, some
courts have added reservations and qualifications as to its application.
We are told, for example, that the principle refers to the "minimum
ingredients"5 for relief; that it does not provide a "precise analytic tool";6
and that a finding of duress depends on the case's "distinctive features".
Indeed, the reasoning in many judgments appear to be conclusory, by
which I mean that the court appears to prefer to state a result rather than
to explain why that result is required by the principle.8
The aim of this paper is to help bridge the gap between the general
principle and the results in particular cases, thereby providing more
certainty in the application of the law. Indeed the case law reveals an
intermediary layer of analysis between the general principle and the
results in particular cases, which indicates that the application of the
doctrine of duress in a particular case depends on the court's evaluation
of five distinct, yet intertwined, enquiries. These are:
1. whether the pressure can be described as "improper" in those
circumstances;
2. whether there is a prior relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant;
3. whether the defendant's motivation in exerting the pressure can
be described as 'improper' in the circumstances;
4. whether the outcome is inappropriate, either because the contract
should not have been procured by these means or is intrinsically
unfair; and
5. whether the plaintiff felt sufficiently pressured to enter into a
contract which he or she might not otherwise have entered into.
The enquiries may differ in the guidance they provide. Where this occurs
the courts are required to adopt a balancing exercise.
A consideration of the five enquiries comprising this intermediary layer
of analysis provides more meaningful guidance in determining and then
analysing the'distinctive features' of a particular fact situation than that
5 Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co [19991 1 Lloyd's Rep 620 at 637 per
Mance J.
6 Adam Opel GmbH v Mitras Automotove UK Ltd [2007] EWHC 3252; [2008]
CILL 2561 at [26].
CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd above n 2, at 717 per Steyn LJ;
Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co above n 5.
8 This is illustrated by the Court's use of the factors specified in Pao On v
Lau Yiu Long, above n 2. See text to notes 135-136 and 143-144.
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offered by the general principle. It also provides a framework against
which specific considerations in individual cases can be generalised.
As a background to a consideration of these five enquiries, the statement
of principle as to what constitutes duress is considered in the next part
(Part II). The material in this part includes a consideration of the factors
that have encouraged the development of a general principle.
Building upon this, the material in Part III considers individual cases
to reveal the intermediary layer of analysis and the five enquiries noted
above. In revealing this intermediary layer of analysis and considering
the application of each of the factors (and their inter-relationship) the
paper's emphasis is upon New Zealand cases but reference is also made
to key English' and commonwealth cases.
II. The Development of General Statements of Principle
1. Background
Agreements to vary existing contracts present competing policy concerns.
On the one hand, sanctity of contract and associated concerns suggest
that contractual variation should be discouraged. Alternatively, freedom
of contract and economic efficiency suggest the opposite.
An early response to these concerns was the pre-existing duty rule.'o
In hindsight this rule was a blunt response, in that it required new
consideration by the defendant rather than evaluating the pressure
exerted by defendant seeking the contractual variation." But until
recently this response was seen as appropriate. Moreover this situation
was not seen as coming within the scope of the doctrine of duress. Its
concern was seen as being largely with contracts entered into and money
obtained as a result of actual violence or the threat of violence, and money
obtained as a result of either improper application of the legal process
or the duress of goods. 2
More recently the operation of the pre-existing duty rule has been
relaxed.' 3 The courts have also recognised a wide range of economic
pressures that may be improper and, when they result in the plaintiff
entering into a contract, may constitute duress. Moreover, the recognition
of 'economic' duress (and 'lawful-act' duress, if it is different) has
9 The New Zealand position is very similar to the English law, see Attorney-
General for England and Wales v R [2002] 2 NZLR 91 (CA) at [32] per Tipping
J.
10 Attributed to Stilk v Myrick (1809) 2 Camp 317; 170 ER 1168, this rule
excluded as a "consideration" a subsequent promise to do an act which
the promisor was already contractually bound to the promisee to perform." Beatson, Duress, above n3.
12 Ibid.
13 Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd above n 4; An tons Trawling
Co Ltd v Smith above n 4, at [89]-[93]; Adam Opel GmbH v Mitras Automotove
above n 6, at [42]; compare South Caribbean Trading Ltd v Trafihura Beheer
BV [2004] EWHC 2676; [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep 128 at [107]-[109].
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required courts to incorporate this type of duress within the wider
doctrine of duress. The current statements of general principle have
been the response. To these we now turn.
2. The General Principle
The impact of the recognition of economic duress for our understanding
of the doctrine of duress should not be under-estimated. As a starting
point, this recognition raised the question whether the doctrine is
plaintiff-focused (upon the quality of the plaintiff's assent to the
contract) or defendant-focused (upon the quality of the defendant's
conduct in pressuring the plaintiff). The (now) orthodox English and
New Zealand two-limb formulation of the general principle reflects
this tension. It refers to both a defendant-focused consideration (the
defendant's pressure must be "regarded in law as illegitimate") and a
plaintiff-focused consideration (did the defendant's illegitimate pressure
bring "about an absence of practical choice" for the plaintiff).1 4 In turn,
two features are said to determine whether the pressure is illegitimate.
These are the nature of the pressure exerted by the defendant and the
nature of the defendant's demand. The general principle applies to all
types of duress.
Care should be taken with the general principle, for its phrases are not
"terms of art". Some courts express the underlying concerns differently.
So, for example, some courts and commentators use the adjective
"improper" in preference to "illegitimate" to describe the adverse nature
of the offending pressure.'" An advantage in preferring "improper" over
"illegitimate" is that it may more clearly convey the message that an
important consideration is the defendant's motivation for the use of the
pressure. For that reason the word "improper" is preferred in this paper.
Some courts also reorientate the second limb by enquiring whether the
14 These phrases are taken from the judgment of Ti pping J in Attorney-General
for England and Wales v R above n 9. In turn they are derived from the
speech of Lord Scarman (and to some extent Lord Diplock) in Universe
Tankships Inc ofMonrovia v International Transport Workers Federation [1983]
1 AC 366, which had received the approval of their Lordships in Dimskal
Shipping Co SA v International Transport Workers Federation [19921 2 AC 152.
This approach subsequently received the approval of the Privy Council in
Attorney-Generalfor England and Wales v R [2003] UKPC 22; [2004] 2 NZLR
577 at [15]-[16], which in turn was regarded as settling the law in New
Zealand, see Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v Attorney-General (2004) 17 PRNZ
308 (SC) at [2]. An earlier formulation suggested that that the pressure
must be such so as to overbear the plaintiff's will thereby vitiating their
consent to the contract, see Pao On v Lau Yiu Long above n 2, but despite
its use in Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v Attorney-General, its use has been
discouraged, as being "apt to mislead", see McIntrye v Nemesis DBK Ltd
329; [2010] 1 NZLR 463 at [64] per O'Regan J.
' Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v Attorney-General above n 2, at [98]; McIntrye v
Nemesis DBK Ltd above n 2, at [19]; P Atiyah "Duress and the Overborne
Will Again" (1983) 99 LQR 353 ("Atiyah").
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pressure was "a significant cause" of the plaintiff's agreement.'6
Another reason for taking care with the general principle is that while it
refers to discrete requirements, the courts do not regard it as a code. This
leads to variations in approach. So, for example, some courts stress that
the two major strands in the principle - improper pressure and absence
of practical choice - are linked and require them to conduct an overall
assessment of the parties' behaviour. 7 Depending upon the particular
circumstances before them, however, other courts emphasise different
aspects of the principle.18
The requirements of "improper pressure" and "absence of practical
choice" are, in turn, a product of two considerations which the courts
view as being particularly important in shaping the doctrine of duress.
First, there is the difficulty of determining what pressures should
attract judicial censure. Underlying this is the question "what are the
'permissible limits of coercion in our society'?"19 The second difficulty is
one of determining whether the pressure was causative of the plaintiff's
decision to do the sought-after act. These difficulties are considered
briefly now so as to enable a better appreciation of some of the nuances
in the general principle.
3. A Reason for the Development of a General Principle -Difficulties in
Determining When Economic Pressure is Improper
The doctrine of duress is not concerned with the use of pressure per se.
Pressure is a part of everyday life.20 Rather, the doctrine is concerned
with the use of pressure that the law regards as improper. The adjective
"improper" provides a label under which to marshal the judicial
considerations which determine if the particular use of pressure in a
certain fact situation is to be sanctioned or not.
16 See Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co above n 5, 636 (Mance J); PAC
Limited v Hamilton Heritage Limited CA, 20 March 1996, Hirst, Peter Gibson
and Ward LJJ) (Transcript: John Larking; available on Lexis, last accessed
October 2009); DSND Subsea Ltd v Petroleum Geo Services ASA [2000] BLR
530, at [131]; Carillion Construction Limited v Felix (UK) Limited [2001] BLR
1, at [24].
Attorney-General for England and Wales v R above n 9, at [62]; Adam Opel
GmbH v Mitras Automotove UK Ltd above n 6, at [26].
18 Some courts, for example, appear to focus on whether the plaintiff has any
practical choice and, in so doing, rely upon the factors discussed in Pao
On v Lau Yiu Long above n 2. See text to notes 135-136 and 143-144. In a
similar vein, recent cases, such as McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd above n 2,
indicate that the courts consider the totality of the evidence to determine
if there has been an affirmation of the contract.
19 Atiyah, above note 15, at 356. See Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v Attorney-
General above n 2, at [96] and McIntrye v Nemesis DBK Ltd above n 2, at
[67].
20 Attorney-General for England and Wales v R above n 9, at [62] per Tipping
J ("The starting point must be that the law recognises people generally
act under some degree of pressure in making decisions affecting their
commercial and other interests").
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A starting point: the traditional pressures
Prior to the recognition that economic pressures may be used improperly,
it was comparatively easy to determine whether the use of a pressure was
improper. Traditionally the law recognised types of improper pressure.21
These included acts of personal violence or threats thereof, improper
application of the legal process, duress of goods, and refusal to provide
certain goods or services except on certain terms.
The most straightforward type of pressure to evaluate was (and
remains) the use of, or threatened use of, violence. This is because
this pressure contravenes the criminal law, which in turn, provides an
external reference point of unacceptable behaviour.22 The finding of
duress appears to be largely consequential upon that.
While not as straightforward the other traditional forms of improper
pressure such as duress of goods, also make use of an external reference
point - commonly the law of torts - to assist in the evaluation process.
Significantly these pressures reveal that their evaluation may involve a
delicate balancing act. This is because their external reference point is
less absolute, in that the circumstances in which the pressure is exerted
plays a prominent role in determining whether the defendant's actions
are seen as contravening the general law of the land. This is illustrated
of the approach of the courts with respect to duress of goods. 23
Typically, whether a defendant's threat - to withhold return of the
plaintiff's property (followed by the actual refusal to do so) unless the
plaintiff pays a sum of money or promises to do so 24 - is improper,
depends on whether the refusal constitutes an act of conversion. This in
turn depends on whether the plaintiff has the immediate right to possess
the goods. In straightforward cases, where the transfer of possession
from the plaintiff to the defendant is not consensual or the defendant
21 See generally G Jones (ed) Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution, (7th ed,
London, 2007) ("Goff and Jones"), at [10-004] - [1010-024].
22 In Royal Boskalis Westminster NV v Mountain [1999] QB 674 at 730-732
Phillips LJ confirmed the existence of a distinction between classes of
duress depending on whether the act was so "unconscionable" that it
would "cause the English court, as a matter of public policy, to override
the proper law of the contract". He gave the example of a threat to use
people as a human shield.
23 Another illustration is approach of the courts to determine whether
observations surrounding the laying of a complaint of criminal conduct
against the plaintiff constitute blackmail and therefore an improper
pressure. See text to notes 47-52.
24 Skeate v Beale (1841) 11 Ad & El 989, 113 ER 688 suggested that a contract
could not be set aside for duress of goods but this approach has been
criticised, see Goffand Jones, above n 21, at[ 10-013] - [10-014]; and Beatson,
Duress, above n 3, at 99-106. In Mann v Buxton CA 49/90, 31 July 1990, a
contract was set aside, as being obtained through duress of goods.
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knows that he or she no longer retains the right to possess the goods,2 5
the claim of duress should be successful. But goods can be retained in
the context of a commercial relationship between the parties and, because
of this, the issue whether the defendant is entitled to retain possession
of the goods may be unclear.26
Difficulties in evaluating economic pressures
Despite the difficulties associated with evaluating some of the traditional
forms of pressure, the task is easier than evaluating economic pressures.
This is because the courts have, as a matter of legal policy, already
independently concluded that the type of pressure is one which the
defendant is not entitled to make, either in any situation (eg, violence)
or in some situations (eg, refusal to return goods).
It is much more difficult to determine whether the use of economic
pressure is improper.27 Economic pressure can be exerted without
contravening the criminal law or committing a tort.28 Moreover, "tough,
even ruthless, negotiation which ... may put pressure upon a weaker
party to capitulate" 29 is a part of everyday commerce; so too is taking
advantage of the plaintiff's need and or vulnerabilities.
A defendant's refusal to perform an existing contract illustrates some
of these difficulties. First, the refusal may or may not constitute a
breach of contract, and only the court may resolve whether it is. 30 An
added complication is that the defendant may genuinely believe that
they were entitled to make the threat.31 Second, even if it is a breach of
25 Astley v Reynolds (1731) 2 Str 915, 93 ER 939. Pawnbroker seeking a
payment greater than the then legal rate of interest. See Goff and Jones,
ibid, at [10-011].
26 Mann v Buxton, above n 24. There a former business partner retained a
certificate of title to land as a security for payment of debts. The Court
saw this as a contractual dispute c.f. Hawker Pacific Pty Ltd v Helicopter
Charter Pty Ltd (1991) 22 NSWLR 299 (NSW CA). There a repairer refused
to release an urgently required helicopter unless its owner agreed to
release the repairer for any liability for disputed repair work. The Court
classified this as a duress of goods case.
27 Attorney-General for England and Wales v R above n 9, at [62] per Tippin
J ("Illegitimacy of pressure can sometime arise from conduct which
is unlawful in itself, albeit it will of course be easier to demonstrate
illegitimacy of pressure if it derives from conduct which is unlawful in
itself").
28 Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers
Federation above n 2, at 385 per Lord Diplock.
29 PAC Limited v Hamilton Heritage Limited above n 16, per Ward LJ.
3 B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications [19841ICR 419 (did
force majeure clause apply?). For this reason, the observation in McIntyre
v Nemesis DBK Ltd above n 2, at [31] that the Court would "proceed on
the basis that a threat to breach a contract is unlawful and generally
illegitimate" begs the question.
31 Carillion Construction Limited v Felix (UK) Limited [2001] BLR 1 at [37].
The defendant "genuinely (but mistakenly) believed" that it was entitled
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contract, the law generally confers upon a contracting party the ability
to "deliberate[ly] breach" their contract and pay damages; the exception
is when the contract is specifically enforceable. 32
The crucial point is that the evaluation of the pressure requires more
than a reference to a standard provided by another branch of the
law. Rather the courts must evaluate the pressure against a range of
considerations, including the specific context in which it was exerted.
4. Another Reason for the Development of a General Principle
- Difficulties in Evaluating the Effect of Economic Pressure
Typically issues of causation raise complex questions irrespective of the
legal context in which they arise. In the context of the law of duress,
however, the recognition that economic pressures may be improper
and that duress may be present in the contractual variation situation
introduces a new layer of complexity in evaluating of the causal effect
of the pressure upon the plaintiff.
A starting point is the general question - "what is 'the extent to which
society can legitimately require people to stand up to threats when they
are made, rather than to submit and litigate afterwards'?"3 3 Unique
challenges arise in addressing this question in the context of evaluating
the effect of pressures directed to "encouraging" a party to enter into
a contract or a variation. One challenge involves reaching the right
balance between the competing policy concerns of sanctity of contract
and protection again contracts entered into by improper pressure. The
second is to evaluate the range of influences potentially acting upon
the plaintiff.
Balancing sanctity of contract and misuse of pressure
Just as parties can reach binding compromise agreements to disputed
claims,3 parties to a contract may vary their contractual obligations. To
some degree this ability undermines the idea of sanctity of contract but,
alternatively, it strengthens the role of contract as a facilitative device.
In any event, the contractual variation attracts legal recognition and
protection; sanctity of contract attaches to the variation.
The application of the doctrine of duress in the contractual variation
situation has the ability to undermine the re-established sanctity of
to stop performing the contract. McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd above n 2,
at [54] "Clause 10 envisaged that if the parties agreed to a change, they
would resolve a new management practice. It was not inconsistent with
the joint venture agreement for [the defendant] ... to initiate a process
aimed at agreeing such a change."
32 Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd above n 4. See also
Beatson, Duress, above n 3, 129.
33 Atiyah, above n 15, at 356. Skeate v Beale above n 24, was seen as precluding
plaintiffs from entering into contracts and then raising the issue of
duress.
Cook v Wright (1861) 1 B & S 559; 121 ER 822. See Beatson, "Duress", above
n 3, at 99-103.
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contract. A concern is that a plaintiff may misuse the doctrine by choosing
to enter into a contractual variation so as to secure the defendant's
performance of a key obligation and then resort to the doctrine of duress
with the aim of restoring the original contract.
To guard against this risk the second limb of the general principle
emphasises the need to ensure that the plaintiff did enter into the
variation under duress. To assist in determining this many courts turn to
the list of factors identified in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long.35 The point is that
this limb, supplemented on occasions by a positive finding that plaintiff
has affirmed the variation,36 is employed to protect against this risk.
Evaluating the influences operating upon the plaintiff
A plaintiff may agree to a variation for a range of reasons, sometimes
conflicting reasons. As a result the courts need to evaluate the plaintiff's
response to the defendant's pressure so as to determine its effect. The
associated challenges are illustrated by considering the situation where
the plaintiff is "asked" to confer some unbargained-for advantage upon
the defendant or to relax their obligations.
In this situation there may be positive commercial reasons why the
plaintiff agrees to the modification. In essence the plaintiff takes the
opportunity presented by the defendant's approach to gain something
they value, eg, to modify their rights/obligations or to clarify their
position. In this situation even if the defendant is found to have exerted
an improper pressure, it may not be regarded as operative."
More problematic is the situation where, from the plaintiff's
perspective, the variation results in a less advantageous contract. It is
tempting to assume that as the plaintiff would have preferred not to enter
into the variation, that they must have done so against their wishes and
that, consequently, the pressure must have been the cause. But even
though the defendant's pressure may be the impetus for the plaintiff
reconsidering their position, a court may conclude that the pressure was
not causative. Pao On v Lau Yiu Long," for example, illustrates that the
court may conclude that the plaintiff's agreement was the result of their
rational decision that completion of a less advantageous contract was
still better that having to sue the defendant for breach of contract.
35 Above n 2. See text to notes 135-136 and 143-144.
36 Haines v Carter [2001] 2 NZLR 167 (CA). The "defendant" claimed that
he entered into a property agreement as a result of the plaintiff's threat
to inform the tax department as to his dealings. Despite this claim the
defendant was only seeking to set aside parts of the agreement and the
Court of Appeal held that this constituted an affirmation.
Moyes & Groves Ltd v Radiation New Zealand Ltd [1982] 1 NZLR 368 (CA).
XS Racing & Even Marketing Limited v Sunseeker Europe Ag & Co KG [2005]
EWHC 3023 at [32].
38 Above n 2. There agreement to the variation was prompted by commercial
considerations associated with a fear of loss of confidence in their
company, delay associated with litigation, and the belief that the variation




To summarise so far, the recognition that economic pressure may
constitute duress has required flow-on developments to the doctrine
of duress. Whether the pressure is improper or not can no longer be
determined by resort to an external legal reference point such as the
criminal law and the law of torts. And because the pressure is less
clearly improper, issues of causation and commercial certainty play a
more prominent role.
The general statement of principle reflects the resulting developments
to the doctrine and provides an accurate indication of the judicial
approach when determining a claim of duress. But the general principle
is expressed at a high level of abstraction. As such, important nuances
in the case law can be overlooked. This paper now turns to bridging
the gap between the general statement of principle and the specific
considerations, which influence the court.
III. Bridging the Gap Between the General Principle and Results in
Particular Cases
1. An Intermediary Layer of Analysis
As a first stage in bridging this gap, an analysis of New Zealand case
law (supported by English and Commonwealth case law) reveals an
intermediary layer of analysis between the general principle and the
results in particular cases. It is submitted that this provides more
meaningful guidance in determining and then analysing the "distinctive
features" of a particular fact situation than that offered by the general
principle. It also provides a framework against which specific
considerations in individual cases can be generalised.
The intermediary layer of analysis suggests that the courts will set
aside a contract for duress when they are satisfied, in broad terms, that
the defendant has brought improper pressure to bear on the plaintiff,
to make him agree to enter into the contract with the defendant. Before
doing so, they will enquire:
1. whether the pressure can be described as "improper" in these
circumstances;
2. whether there is a prior relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant;
3. whether the defendant's motivation in exerting the pressure can be
described as "improper" in these circumstances,
4. whether the outcome is inappropriate, either because the contract is
intrinsically unfair, or because it is not something which should have
been procured by these means; and
5. whether the plaintiff felt sufficiently pressured to enter into a contract
which he or she might not otherwise have entered into.
Three further general points may be added. The first is that enquiries
2, 3, and 4 (if necessary) supplement enquiry 1 in the overall task of
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determining if the pressure was improper.
The second point is that while all five enquiries will sometimes be
taken as distinct questions, they are intertwined,"39 so that the result of one
enquiry can affect what the court will look for as it goes on to the other
enquiries. Thus, for example, the more improper the pressure is (or the
more inappropriate the outcome is), the easier it is to persuade the court
that the plaintiff was sufficiently pressured to enter into the contract.
The final point is a reminder that the results to enquiries 2, 3 and 4
may not be consistent in their own evaluation of the pressure. In this
situation the courts appear to place more emphasis upon enquiry 4, but
otherwise undertake a holist evaluation.
We turn now to each of these enquiries.
2. Enquiry One: Is the Pressure Improper?
The pressure scale
As is recognised in the general principle, the nature of the pressure is a
key consideration in determining whether it is improper. Pressures are
not equal - either in their "persuasive" affect or in the degree to which
they can be viewed as improper. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify
a scale of types of pressure. The respective ranking of three different
groups of pressure can be located upon this scale.
In descending order of ease to establish that the pressure was improper,
these groups are: (i) pressures infringing the criminal law; (ii) pressures
contravening public policy; and (iii) economic pressures. In turn,
pressures coming within these groups can be further divided into sub-
groups. When evaluating the use of a particular pressure, its location
upon this scale indicates the initial presumptive strength of the plaintiff's
claim. If required, enquiries 2, 3 and 4 then assist the court to evaluate
the pressure.
Topping the scale: pressures infringing the criminal law
Not surprisingly, at the top of the scale are acts of personal violence and
threats thereof. Such pressures are clearly improper, irrespective of the
parties' relationship (enquiry 2) or the defendant's motivation (enquiry
3). Moreover public policy against the use of violence is so strong that,
despite observations that duress should not be lightly found, 40 it is
relatively easier for the plaintiff to satisfy the court that the outcome of
the exercise of this pressure was inappropriate (enquiry 4) and that, as
a result, he was sufficiently pressured to enter the contract (enquiry 5).
Barton v Armstrong41 illustrates the courts response to these pressures.
There the Privy Council suggests that once the plaintiff shows that a
threat of violence was made, the defendant must prove that the threat
3 Adam Opel GmbH v Mitras Automotove UK Ltd above n 6, at [26].
40 Kim v Park HC Auckland CP 250/01, 11 December 2002.
41 [1976] AC 104.
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had not been "a reason" for the plaintiff's entry into the contract.4 2
Additionally Barton v Armstrong suggests that the courts are less
sympathetic to the defendant's claim that the plaintiff should have acted
earlier to avoid the contract. 43
Cases involving violence display another example of the intertwining
of the enquiries. The fact that the court regards the resulting contract
as intrinsically unfair (and therefore an inappropriate outcome) is of
evidentiary significance - both as to the existence of the pressure and
its causative significance - in discharging the plaintiff's initial onus of
proof. In Kim v Park," for example, the plaintiff claimed that he agreed
to a variation because of threats of violence. In evaluating this claim
the Court was influenced by the fact that pursuant to the agreement the
plaintiff had agreed to repay some $125,000 more than the approximately
$101,000 debt he owed to the defendant. The Court described the
agreement as "seriously unfair" .45
The end result - a defendant seeking to uphold a contract in the face of
a claim by the plaintiff that they entered into it because of the defendant's
violence or threat thereof is pretty much reliant upon persuading the
court that there was no violence or threat thereof.46
Still remaining within the province of the criminal law, but less clearly
an improper pressure, is the threat to instigate criminal prosecution
- a subset of the blackmail cases. These threats "ha[ve] generally been
regarded as improper", 47 but in practice the courts have developed a
number of distinctions to determine whether observations surrounding
the laying of a complaint of criminal conduct against the plaintiff
constitutes blackmail and an improper pressure. An initial distinction is
between a threat to lay a complaint and a "warning of consequences" 48
if a complaint is laid. Assuming a threat, some courts require evidence
that the defendant promised to stifle any resulting prosecution.49 Other
influential matters are whether the threat was made with respect to
the actions of another,5 0 and whether the threat was used to gain an
42 In Barton v Armstrong, ibid, there were two reasons why the plaintiff
agreed to pay a premium price for the defendant's shares in a financially
distressed company. These were the defendant's threat of violence, and
the plaintiff's belief that the company's difficulties could be resolved.
43 In Barton v Armstrong, ibid, there was a delay of almost one year between
the entered into the deed of purchase (17/1/1967) and the challenge to
its validity (10/1/1968).
4 Above n 40.
45 Ibid, at [52]. Barton v Armstrong, above n 41.
46 Hobbs v Gilbert HC Nelson CIV-1999-442-2, 21 September 2004. Dispute
between a financial adviser and investment company. The Court doubted
whether threats of personal violence had been made as alleged.
47 Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v Attorney-General above n 2.
48 Beatson, Duress, above note 3, at118.
49 Flower v Sadler (1882) 10 QBD 572, 573 per Lord Coleridge CJ, and at 575
per Brett LJ. See generally Goff and Jones, above n 21, at [10-009].
5 Williams v Bayley (1866) LR 1 HL 200. Threat directed to a member of the
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advantage in an unrelated matter."
As occurs with threats of personal violence, a conclusion that the
defendant's threat constituted an offence should lead to a finding that the
threat constituted an improper pressure. The criminal nature of the threat
should also dispose a court to a finding that the plaintiff felt sufficiently
pressured (enquiry 5) but, since the threat if carried out leads to court
proceedings in which the plaintiff can defend themselves, a court may
conclude that the threat wasn't causative. 52
Descending the scale: pressures contravening public policy
This group comprises two main sub-groups. The first sub-group
comprises the straightforward duress of goods case where the refusal
to return the plaintiff's goods constitutes a tortious act. The second
sub-group comprises demands colore officii, eg, those cases in which the
defendant is under a public duty to provide certain goods or services
but refuses to do so except on certain terms.
This group of pressures is ranked below the earlier group (pressures
infringing the criminal law) to reflect that they do not attract the same
policy considerations requiring that they be classified as improper.
Consequently the circumstance in which the threat occurs plays a more
prominent role in determining whether the general law of the land
classifies the pressure as improper. This is displayed by the duress of
goods cases.
These cases are of further interest, for, as was noted earlier, a threat to
retain the plaintiff's property when the defendant does not have the right
to possess those goods is one of the traditional forms of duress.5 3 But the
threat may also involve economic pressure and disputed claims over the
parties' obligations. This arises when the defendant has possession of
the goods pursuant to a contract and is refusing to return them because
of an underlying dispute as the parties' contractual obligations. Indeed,
where the threat is made in the context of a prior contractual relationship
with a view to contractual renegotiation, the courts seem more reluctant
to classify the threat as improper. 4
This reinforces the importance courts place upon the circumstance in
which the threat is made. But it also reveals that some duress of goods
cases bridge the gap between the traditional approach in which pressures
come within recognised "types" and the modern approach evidenced by
the general statement of principle. For this reason some of these cases
may be seen as coming within the next group.
plaintiff's family. Discussed in Goff and Jones, ibid, at [10-010].
5' Haines v Carter above n 36.
52 Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v Attorney-General above n 2, at [1041. 'Plaintiff'
received legal advice questioning the'defendant's claim that the plaintiff
had committed an offence.
5 See text to notes 24-26.
54 Mann v Buxton, above n 24.
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Descending the scale further: economic pressures
Not surprisingly, economic pressures comprise the last group on this
scale. This ranking reflects the fact that, as its starting point, the general
law of the land does not view economic pressure is being automatically
improper. In this respect economic pressures are the opposite to acts
(or threats) of violence. The point is that the initial identification of the
pressure is largely irrelevant; whether the pressure is improper turns
on the answers to enquiries 2, 3 and 4 (the parties relationship, the
defendant's motives, and the appropriateness of the outcome).
Economic pressures take many forms. Included within this group are
threats not to perform an existing contract, threats to commence civil
litigation, and threats to exercise a prerogative the defendant has, such as
not to enter into a contract on those terms or withdraw a privilege which
the plaintiff enjoys but has no entitlement to, eg, "lawful-act" duress.
The contractual variation situation encompasses the first sub-group.
It is tempting to assume that a deliberate breach of contract (or threat
thereof) will constitute improper pressure" but the case law shows that
this is not the case.56 Nevertheless a breach of contract is more serious
than say a threat to commence civil litigation, hence the relative ranking
of this sub-group. The refusal to perform the contract may be manifested
in a number of ways, eg, refusal to settle an agreement for sale and
purchase of land, refusal to release goods the subject of the contract,
refusal to supply goods or services the subject of the contract, refusal
to make a payment required by the contract. Within these examples,
case law suggests that a court is more likely to find a refusal to settle the
agreement as improper" and less likely to do so with respect to a refusal
to make a payment.5 1
Threats to invoke the civil legal process are ranked next, followed by
lawful-act duress. This reflects the difficulty of persuading a court to
evaluate a lawful act as improper. While the courts have recognised
5 McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd, above n 2, at [31].
56 Churchill Group Holdings Ltd v Abel (1989) 4 NZCLC 64,830 (HC).
Purchaser refusing to settle purchase of commercial building acquired
as an investment property unless vendor entered into a lease agreement;
the purchaser claiming that the vendor's agents had represented that the
building would be tenanted.
5 Knutson v The Bourkes Syndicate [1941] SCR 419, (SCC). Vendor refusing
to settle unless purchaser assumed responsibility for discharging an
encumbrance; In re Hooper & Grass'Contract [1949] VLR 269 (SC). Vendor
refusing to settle unless purchaser agreed with their apportionment of a
statutory irrigation charge; cf Churchill Group Holdings Ltd v Abel, above
n 56.
" AE McDonald Ltd v Adams (1985) 1 NZBLC 102,208, (HC) ("promise of
prompt cash in the hand ... is a common enough factor in bargaining
situations" at 102,214 (Eichelbaum J)); Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v
Attorney-General, above n 2 (withholding of funds is common in civil
disputes, at [107]
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that the category exists,5 9 there is little detailed consideration of when a
threat to do a lawful act will constitute duress.
3. Enquiry Two: What is the Nature of the Parties'Relationship?
Overview
This enquiry is closely associated with enquiry 3 (the defendant's
motives) and enquiry 4 (whether the outcome was inappropriate). In
all three enquiries, the judicial attention changes from types of pressures
per se to the exercise of a particular pressure in the circumstances before
the court. The importance of these enquiries increases as the pressure
descends the scale of improper pressures. The collective aim is to
determine whether the use of a (potentially improper) pressure in those
circumstances was improper.
Enquiry 2 focuses upon the parties' relationship. The key message
is that the parties' relationship colours the court's impression of the
defendant's pressure. Pressures that may properly be used against a
stranger may become improper when the parties are in a more complex
relationship. This is because the parties' relationship may make the
plaintiff dependent upon the defendant or particularly vulnerable to
the defendant's pressure.6 0 By enquiring as to the defendant's motives,
enquiry 3 builds upon the concern that the relationship may have been
exploited. Of course an inappropriate outcome (enquiry 4) may be of
evidentiary significance as indicating that the defendant did exploit the
parties' relationship.
The importance of the parties' relationship as "a factor relevant to
duress" was recognised by Tipping J in Attorney-General for England
and Wales v R.6 1 As was noted earlier, its importance is displayed with
duress of goods. The courts are more reluctant to conclude that a threat
to retain the goods is improper when the parties are in a contractual
relationship and there is a dispute as to whether the plaintiff has the
immediate right to possess the goods.62 Similarly the courts evaluation of
a threat to commence litigation is influenced by the nature of the parties'
relationship. As the relationship becomes more complicated there is a
5 CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd, above n 2; Shivas v Bank of New
Zealand [1990] 2 NZLR 327 at 345 (HC); Attorney-General for England and
Wales v R [2003] UKPC 22; [2004] 2 NZLR 577 at [16].
60 Through the relationship the defendant may learn of pressures that the
plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to. See Carillion Construction Limited v
Felix (UK) Limited [2001] BLR 1. Felix, a subcontractor to Carillion, was
responsible for suppling exterior cladding units. The parties disagreed
over some of Felix's charges and Felix threatened to withhold deliveries.
The threat was made at a time when Felix knew that other tradespeople
were dependent on their supply of these units, and that Carillion was
becoming concerned as to the delays, at [39]. See also Adam Opel GmbH
v Mitras Automotove UK Ltd above n 6, (discussed in text to notes 146-
149).
61 Above n 9, at [68] per Tipping J.
62 See text to notes 24-26.
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corresponding increase in scope for legitimate disagreement between the
parties as to their respective rights and infringement of those rights.
The spectrum of relationships
Relationships differ. At one end of the spectrum are people who lack a
close prior relationship and have no reason to expect any more than that
each will observe the general law of the land. It is here that the traditional
types of pressures are to be found, for example threats of personal
violence, blackmail. Threats to seize or withhold the plaintiff's property
unrelated to any contractual dispute also arise here. Alternatively
economic pressure is likely to be seen as everyday commercial pressure
and, as such, proper.
At the other end of the spectrum, we find people who are in such a
relationship of reliance and trust that the law implies a duty to act in
good faith, even a duty of loyalty. Franchise agreements and the like
illustrate the circumstances when duties of this type are implied.63
Bordering this situation are people who are so closely related to
each other that they rely on a contract, or some similar commercial
arrangement, to regulate matters between them. There is a 'prior'
contractual relationship in the sense that a contract exists at the time
that the defendant puts pressure on the plaintiff to make a new contract.
Often the plaintiff will be required to give up advantages that he was
entitled to under the pre-existing relationship. This is the context in
which the contractual variation situation arises. It is considered more
deeply in the next subsection.
In between are other relationships, for example those involving
employer and employee,' those involving agents of the crown and the
crown,6 5 and those who have close personal relations, for example by
reason of family connection, 66 or one of them being a trusted advisor of
the other.61
63 US law provides an interesting comparison to Anglo-New Zealand law
in respect of both the willingness to impose a duty of good faith and fair
dealing in the performance of a contract and the express recognition that
a breach of this duty constituted an improper threat for the doctrine of
duress. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, s 205, is representative
of the US position. This imposes upon the parties to a contract a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of the contract and its
enforcement. See also § 176(1)(d) which provides that a threat is improper
if it is a breach of this duty.
6 Hepworth Heating Ltd v Akers EAT/13/02/MAA EAT/846/02/MAA 21
January 2003; 2003 WL 21047510.
65 Attorney-General for England and Wales v R, above n 59, (Soldier serving
in an elite unit).
6 See Shea v Ward (2001) 20 FRNZ 662 (CA). Property dispute between
former defacto partners, allegation of a threat to lay a complaint of assault:
Haines v Carter above n 36.
67 Certainly such relationships do sometimes appear in cases of duress,
compounding the difficulties that a plaintiff will have faced in dealing
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Contractual relationships
Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers and Distributors) Ltd6 illustrates that
an existing contractual relationship is an important factor in evaluating
the defendant's pressure. Atlas had contracted to deliver Kafco's
products for a certain price. Subsequently Atlas discovered that it had
miscalculated the price and refused to make future deliveries unless
Kafco agreed to a price increase. The new price may have been fair,
but the court concluded that Atlas should not have obtained the price
increase by that threat. Through the relationship Atlas knew that Kafco
was particularly vulnerable to its threat, in particular it knew that the
deliveries were "essential" for both Kafco's "success" and its "commercial
survival", 9 and that it "would have been difficult, if not impossible [for
Kafcol... to find alternative carriers in time to meet their delivery dates."7 1
Another illustration involves a refusal to enter into a contract with the
plaintiff except on the defendant's terms. This refusal is more acceptable
behaviour when the parties are strangers. This is because the parties
are assumed to be able to look after their own interests. Moreover,
typically there is a market-place of willing buyers and sellers. This
provides a medium, through which the parties are free to seek alternative
contractual partners and, consequently, a means by which to evaluate
the reasonableness of the refusal to contract."
In contrast, the refusal seems less acceptable when the parties are
in an existing commercial relationship, the plaintiff has detrimentally
relied upon the defendant's encouragement of the continuation of that
relationship and then, at a time when the plaintiff is unable to seek
an alternative contractual partner, is confronted by the defendant's
refusal. 72
In the absence of evidence of exploitation of the relationship, however,
Smith v William Charlick Limited73 illustrates that the mere existence of
with the defendant's threats. But generally these situations will tend to
be governed by the law of fiduciary duty and undue influence.
68 [1989]3 WLR 389 (QB). See also Carillion Construction Limited v Felix (UK)
Limited [2001] BLR 1; and Adam Opel GmbH v Mitras Automotove UK Ltd
above n 6.
69 Ibid, at 392 (per Tucker J).
70 Ibid.
71 See East Coast Gas Supply Limited v Louis Wood & Sons Limited HC Napier
CP 101/88, 10 November 1988. East Coast Gas had offered to contribute
to the cost of a gas line if Lewis Wood agreed to purchase a certain
quantity of gas for use in its business operations. A subsequent fire in
Lewis Wood's factory placed some pressure on it to decide whether to
move to gas, which it did. Some time later Lewis Wood sold the business
but remained bound to acquire the specified quantity of gas. The Court
held there was no duress.
72 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §176, cmt f, 111 3.
7 (1923-1924) 34 CLR 38 (HC Australia). See also Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd
v Attorney-General, above n 2. The Court found that the employee making
the threat did not have authority to do so.
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a relationship does not mean that a refusal to contract is automatically
improper.
There the South Australian Wheat Harvest Board, the sole seller of
wheat in South Australia pursuant to a statutory scheme, threatened
to cease the supply of wheat to William Charlick Limited - a milling
company. The Board acted as the agents of wheat growers and sold
wheat on a weekly basis. The Board had sought to ensure that each
miller received just enough wheat for its immediate needs, but William
Charlick was able to create a stockpile. The Board increased the price
of wheat payable to the growers thereby increasing the price of milled
wheat. This enabled William Charlick to make extra profits from the
stockpiled wheat. The Board believed that this constituted an improper
windfall for William Charlick and refused to sell it any more wheat unless
it paid over to the Board the extra profit from the stockpile; the Board
intended to pass this on to the growers. The High Court of Australia
held that in these circumstances this pressure was proper.
4. Enquiry Three: What was the Defendant's Motivation in Exerting
the Pressure?
Pressure may be exerted for a range of reasons. The case law reveals
that courts are influenced by the defendant's motives, in particular why
they sought that benefit from the plaintiff. As Lord Atkin observed in
Thorne v Motor Trade Association,74 what the blackmailer "has to justify
is not the threat, but the demand of money." 5 The case law reveals a
scale of judicial acceptance of the defendant's motives. To this we now
turn, considering the various motives in descending order of judicial
approval.
The defendant is responding to a genuine commercial dispute
At the approval end of the scale is the situation where the parties are
involved in a genuine commercial dispute as to the performance of the
contract. Perhaps the strongest example of a genuine dispute is when
the dispute arises from an external source for which neither party is
responsible for (or are both equally responsible for), and neither party
has assumed the risk of that event occurring.
This situation is illustrated by Moyes & Groves Ltd v Radiation New
Zealand Ltd.76 This case involved a variation of a contract to supply
certain parts.7 These goods were to be manufactured in India to the
buyer's specifications. For some reason manufacture was delayed by
about two years. And because of personnel changes in both parties the
order was "overlooked".7 1 When the goods finally arrived their price
had increased as a result of increased costs in India. The importer / seller
74 [1937] AC 797.
7s Ibid, at 806.
76 Above n 37.
n7 Ibid, at 371 (per Cooke J).
78 Ibid.
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offered to sell the goods at cost price or to return them to India. The
buyer agreed to buy, albeit under protest. The Court of Appeal held that
there was a genuine disagreement between the parties,79 that it had no
doubt as to bona fides of the importer; 0 and that the parties had agreed
to "a prudent and sensible compromise of a difference on which there
was much to be said on both sides".8 1
McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd82 provides another illustration, albeit here
the court's evaluation of the defendant's motives was "finely balanced".8 3
This case involved the variation of a joint venture land development
agreement; the variation resulted in an increase in the remuneration
payable to the joint venture party (the defendant) responsible for
managing the development. The claim for increased remuneration
was made following considerable delays (and increased work) in
the development arising from disputes with the local Council over
planning and consent issues. While the defendant was "forceful"" in
its demands, suggesting that otherwise it would discontinue managing
the development, the joint venture agreement provided for management
changes and the Court saw the defendant as being motivated to
"initiat[ing] a process aimed at agreeing" to such a change.85
The defendant is responding to the plaintiffs breach of contract
A genuine commercial dispute may also arise out of the parties'
performance of the contract. For example the defendant may allege that
the plaintiff is not performing their contractual obligations and, as its
price for continuing with that relationship, seek a variation. But disputes
can be manufactured. Additionally the defendant (whether acting in
good faith or not) may take an objectively unreasonable interpretation
of the contract.
One judicial response is to determine whether the plaintiff was in
breach. Walmsley v Christchurch City Council" is an example. Walmsley
produced a souvenir programme for the Council. The programme
was to be sold at an air show and Walmsley was to receive a share
of the proceeds. Claiming that the programme contained too many
typographical and grammatical errors, the Council demanded that it
be corrected and engaged another printer. The parties entered into a
new contract pursuant to which Walmsley agreed to pay the cost of re-
printing and the Council guaranteed a certain level of sales. The Court
upheld the agreement. In so doing it considered that Walsmley had
breached its obligations and this justified the Council's own threat to
Ibid, at 373 (per Somers J).
80 Ibid, at 371 (per Cooke J).
Ibid, at 372 (per Cooke J).
82 Above n 2.
83 Ibid, at [61].
8 Ibid.
85 Ibid, at [55].




To anticipate the inter-relationship of this enquiry with enquiry 4 (the
appropriateness of the outcome) a defendant may attempt to exploit the
plaintiff's breach so as to gain a benefit. Walmsley v Christchurch City
Council is of further interest as illustrating the Court's consideration of
the merits of the variation obtained by the defendant. It concluded that
the new agreement "was to its [Walmsley's] advantage"" and his consent
"was a genuine recognition of the situation"."
The defendant is responding to what it believes is the plaintiffs breach of
contract
Many courts do not consider if there was a breach. For them a genuine
dispute is established if the defendant believed that he had an "arguable
case" 0 that the plaintiff was in breach. The point is that a genuine dispute
may exist despite a later finding that the plaintiff was not in breach. This
is illustrated by AE McDonald Ltd v Adams.91
Adams employed AE McDonald Ltd (McDondald) to undertake
earthmoving works. McDonald were to be paid on an hourly rate but
it had given, what Adams believed, to be an estimate of the total price.
The cost of the earthworks increased beyond this figure and Adams
refused to make final payment of the balance of the account, unless
and until the total amount was reduced. Associated with this was the
threat of prolonged and expensive litigation. At the time McDonald
was in some financial difficulties but the court found that there was no
evidence that Adams used this to coerce a settlement or take advantage
of McDonald.92 A compromise agreement was reached between the
parties and after Adams had made the requisite payments McDonald
claimed duress. Adams was unable to establish that the estimate was
binding on McDonald" so that its account was a breach by McDonald.
Nevertheless the court upheld the compromise; Adams' "bona fide belief
... that they had good grounds for arguing that ... [McDonald] right of
recovery was limited"9 4 was enough.
Care must be taken with this quotation as courts reserve the right to
evaluate the defendant's bona fides and, in so doing consider whether
their belief is reasonable." Moreover a bona fide belief of the plaintiff's
breach is not in itself enough to support the classification of a pressure as
proper;" enquiry 4 (the outcome) is also relevant. In AE McDonald Ltd v
87 Ibid, at 208.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid, at 209.
9 Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co, above n 5, at 637 (per Mance J).
9 Above n 58. See also Churchill Group Holdings Ltd v Abel, above n 56.
92 Ibid, at 102,214.
9 Ibid, at 102,210.
94 Ibid, at 102,213, and 102,215.
95 Adam Opel GmbH v Mitras Automotove UK Ltd [20071 above n 6, at [34].
See also Couch v Branch Investments (1969) Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 314 (CA).
* Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co above n 5, at 637 (per Mance J).
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AdamS9 7 the Court appears to regard the compromise as an appropriate
one.98 One thing is clear; a lack of bona fides is fatal.99
The defendant feels honour-bound to respond to the plaintiffs actions
A common feature with the previous two situations is that the defendant
is affected by the plaintiff's breach (or arguable breach) and, motivated
by commercial self-interest, seeks to remedy this.
A variation on this arises when the defendant feels either morally or
legally required to intervene. A key factor in Smith v William Charlick
Limited'0 appears to be that the Board felt honour bound to the growers
to respond to what it regarded as inappropriate behaviour by William
Charlick in gaining a windfall profit.
Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v Attorney-General'01 is similar. It involved
the purchase of pharmaceuticals by a state funded purchasing authority.
The authority discovered that the seller was supplying and charging for
recycled pharmaceuticals and pharmaceuticals given to it by its suppliers.
It believed that this was a breach and considered that it was required to
demand the cessation of this practice and a refund. The Authority was
the seller's sole customer and it exerted various pressures upon the seller
to achieve this including withholding payments and threatening to refer
the matter to the police. Additionally one of the authority's employees
exceeded their authority by (in essence) threatening to cease to deal with
the supplier.10 2 The Court of Appeal found there was no duress.03
The defendant seeks to remedy a poor contract
Sometimes the defendant's motivation is the realisation that they made
a bad bargain and a wish to renegotiate it.1"0 This was the situation in
Pao On v Lau Yiu Long"' and in Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers and
Distributors) Ltd. 0 6 A variation on this is when some external event
occurs, the risk of which the contract assigns to the defendant, but
following the occurrence of the event, they do not wish to bear. Examples
include the risk of striking workers in B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v
9 Above n 58.
9 Ibid, at 102,214.
9 Huyton SA v Peter Cremer GmbH & Co, above n 5, at 637 (per Mance J).
' (1923-1924) 34 CLR 38, (HC Australia).
1o' Above n 2.
102 Ibid, at [106].
103 The Supreme Court declined the seller's application for leave to appeal on
the basis that the appeal "would fail on the facts as found by the Courts
below", see Pharmacy Care Systems Limited v Attorney-General (2004) 17
PRNZ 308, at [3].
104 Peter Kiewit Sons' Co v Eakins Construction Ltd 11960] SCR 361 (SCC)
illustrates the difficulties in distinguishing these two situations. There
the majority concluded that at the most the defendant was "close to being
forced to abandon the contract owing to the pressing claims of creditors"
at 365 (Judson J delivering the minority's judgment).
105 Above n 2.
106 Above n 68.
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Victor Green Publications0 7 and the risk of currency devaluation in the
'Atlantic Baron'.108
Bad bargain making is an inherent contractual risk and, not-
surprisingly, these cases show that this motivation attracts judicial
disapproval. Nevertheless, the different results in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long
and the Atlantic Baron as opposed to Atlas Express Ltd v Kafco (Importers
and Distributors) Ltd and B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green
Publications illustrate that even motivations which warrant judicial
censure may not pressure the plaintiff to such degree to enter into a
contract of which they might not otherwise have entered into (enquiry
5).
The defendant seeks to ensure its commercial survival
This is a variation on the preceding poor contract situation. Occasionally,
the defendant's bargain is so bad (or supervening events make it so)
that a variation is needed to ensure the defendant's commercial survival
and, consequently, their completion of the contract. In this situation the
plaintiff's agreement to the variation is more likely to be as a result of its
rational decision that completion of the contract is in its best interests.
Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd' 09 illustrates this type
of situation and shows that courts look favourably on upholding the
resulting variation. In that case a third party advised the plaintiff of
the defendant's financial position, but the involvement of a third party
should not be required or be decisive.
As occurs with the criminal prosecution cases a key factor may be
whether the advice is seen as a warning of consequences as opposed to
a threat. Indeed, in McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd""o the Court of Appeal
expressly recognised that the courts are alive to the situation "[w]here
one party warns the other that, as a matter of commercial reality, it will
not be able to perform its contractual obligations unless changes are
agreed to" and warned that "care must be taken to distinguish between
... threats [to breach a contract] and ... warnings [that the party is unable
to perform its contract]"."1
The defendant is seeking to exploit the plaintiffs vulnerability so as to obtain
a windfall
The strongest judicial disapproval seems reserved to these situations.
D & C Builders Ltd v Rees112 provides an example. D & C Builders Ltd
107 [1984] ICR 419.
1os North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd v Hyundai Co Ltd [1979] 3 WLR 419.
109 Above n 4. There a sub-contractor got into financial difficulties because
the contract price was too low and tere was a concern whether the sub-
contractor would not be able to complete the contract on time, thereby
exposing the head contractor to a time penalty.
110 Above n 2.
il1 Ibid, at [32]
112 [1966] 2 QB 617. See also PAC Limited v Hamilton Heritage Limited, above
n 5.
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provided building services to the Rees. Aware that the company was
in financial difficulties, the Rees, to quote Lord Denning MR, "behaved
very badly"."3 They offered part-payment in settlement of their account,
threatening that, if the offer was rejected, they would pay nothing. They
also misrepresented their own financial position.11 4 The company agreed
but later successfully challenged the validity of their agreement.
Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers
Federation"5 is another example. There a ship-owner was financially
dependent upon the continued use of its ship. Aware of this a trade
union threatened to "black" the ship unless it received a contribution
to its welfare fund."6 The House of Lords held that the ship-owner had
been subjected to economic duress.
5. Enquiry Four: Was the Outcome Inappropriate?
The term "outcome" refers to what the defendant achieved through the
exertion of their pressure. This enquiry is directed at two different forms
of inappropriate outcomes - first, outcomes that should not have been
procured by the pressure used, and second, intrinsically unfair outcomes
An outcome that should not have been procured by the pressure
This form of inappropriate outcome is perhaps the more straightforward
of the two to justify while, perhaps, the harder to find. The justification is
that some pressures (eg, violence) are not to be used, while other pressures
may not be used to achieve some outcomes.1 1 7 So, for example, a threat
of non-performance of a contract with the aim of responding to the
plaintiff's breach or arguable breach may be appropriate. Alternatively,
the same threat made with the aim of obtaining an unrelated benefit or
windfall would appear to be inappropriate.""
This category of pressures may explain the result in re Hooper & Grass'
Contract."9 The parties had entered an unconditional agreement for sale
and purchase of land. Prior to settlement a disagreement arose over
apportioning an irrigation charge. Ultimately the vendor's solicitor
refused to settle unless his approach was adopted. The purchaser settled
making the required payment. The court concluded that payment was
paid under duress as the vendor was "threatening to withhold that to
113 Ibid, at 626.
114 Ibid.
"1 Above n 2.
116 Ibid, at 383.
117 Jones v Morgan [2001] EWCA Civ 995, [2001] Lloyd's Rep Bank 323, at
[48] per Chadwick LJ (Mortgagee has a "proper interest" in being repaid
monies owed to him and therefore is entitled to threaten to exercise a
power of sale).
118 Adam Opel GmbH Mitras Automotove UK Ltd above n 6. See text to notes
146-149 for a discussion of this case.




which the other party was legally entitled".120 The point is that while
a threat not to settle may be appropriate when there is a fundamental
dispute between the parties, for example involving the nature or qualities
of the property,121 it is inappropriate when the dispute is of a secondary
nature and there are more suitable means of resolving it.
D & C Builders Ltd v Rees122 suggests that threats of non-payment may
also produce an inappropriate outcome when the defendant is exploiting
the plaintiff's financial difficulties in order to obtain a windfall. What
distinguishes this situation from the genuine dispute in which the
promise of prompt payment is used as an inducement to settle (associated
with the implicit threat not to otherwise pay) is the exploitation of the
circumstances; in essence the effectiveness of the pressure is knowingly
leveraged.123
An intrinsically unfair outcome
For some, the suggestion that the outcome is relevant may be controversial.
This is because an evaluation of the fairness of the contract is not seen as
either part of the province of the law of contract nor one for which it is
equipped.124 Nevertheless, as we have seen,125 courts do refer to notions
of fairness, or, to use the words of Sir Donald Nicholls V-C in CTN Cash
and Carry Ltd v Gallaher, courts do evaluate the "overall outcome"'26
when reviewing the pressure.127 This is because an unfair outcome is of
evidentiary significance; the outcome requires an explanation and invites
enquiry into the parties' relationship and the defendant's motivation to
120 Ibid, at 272 (per Fullagar J).
121 Churchill Group Holdings Ltd v Abel, above n 56.
122 Above n 112.
123 This case can be compared with AE McDonald Ltd v Adams (1985) 1 NZBLC
102,208 and Churchill Group Holdings Ltd v Abel, above n 56. In both cases
the courts found no evidence that the "defendant" was exploiting the
"plaintiff's" financial difficulties.
124 Beatson, Duress, above n 3, at 110; Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v Attorney-
General, above n 2, at [87].
125 D & C Builders Ltd v Rees, above n 112.
126 Above n 2, A key consideration for Sir Donald was the fact that through a
threat to withdraw credit facilities (which it was lawfully entitled to do),
Gallagher Ltd had received payment from CTN to reimburse it for a loss
that it wrongly had believed CTN was liable for. While concluding that
CTN's payment had not been obtained by duress Sir Donald observed at
720 that "it does seem to me that prima facie it would be unconscionable
for [Gallagher Ltd] to insist on retaining the money".
127 See also PAC Limited v Hamilton Heritage Limited, above n 16. Hamiltons
was employed by PAC to create a "film" set. When filming was complete
it was realised that the budget for the total project had been exceeded.
PAC was financially able to absorb the loss, but it misrepresented its
financial position (suggesting that it might "fold") and sought a reduction
in the contract price from all the contractors. In finding that the plaintiff's
agreement had been obtained by duress the Court of Appeal noted that
the original price "was reasonable" and "known by both parties to be
so". The associated inference is that the varied price was not reasonable.
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see if the exercise of the pressure in those circumstances was improper.
Alternatively, Moyes & Groves Ltd v Radiation New Zealand Ltdl28 illustrates
how a prima facie fair outcome supports the conclusion that the parties
had reached a sensible compromise. Because of this, this enquiry is a
key one for evaluating economic pressures.
6. Enquiry Five: Did the Plaintiff Feel Sufficiently Pressured to Enter
into the Contract?
Identifying the judicial concern
As is discussed earlier,129 the recognition that economic pressures may
be improper introduced a new layer of complexity in evaluating the
effect of the pressure upon the plaintiff. It is clear that the courts have
had difficulties in responding to this. This explains the different tests
individual courts have advanced.
These tests range from the pressure being "a reason" 30 to requiring
that it "vitiate [the plaintiff's] consent" to the contract.'"' In between
these extremes is the idea that the pressure bring "about an absence
of practical choice" for the plaintiff.132 While this is the phrase used in
the statement of the general principle of the doctrine of duress, there is
support for a test of "significant cause".
The difficulties continue. This is evidenced by the fact that, despite
the relaxation in approach evidenced by the statement of general
principle, some courts continue to ask whether the plaintiff's will was
"overborne"." Then there is the continued use by some courts of the
factors identified in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long'15 as "material" in determining
if there had been "no true consent". These factors are: whether the
plaintiff protested; whether the plaintiff had an alternative course open
to him; whether the plaintiff received independent advice; and whether
the plaintiff took steps to avoid the contract.' 6
What is particularly interesting about the continued use of these
factors is that they fail to provide an accurate indication of the court's
conclusion. The case law shows that neither the presence nor the absence
of either a protest or the availability of independent advice is decisive.
For example, in AE McDonald Ltd v Adams'13 7 the significance of the
protest was discounted on the basis that "the true test of a reasonable
12 Above n 37.
129 See text to notes 37-38.
'3 Barton v Armstrong [1976] AC 104.
131 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long, above n 2.
132 Attorney-Generalfor England and Wales v R, above n 9, at [62] (per Tipping
J).
133 See n 16.
134 Pharmacy Care Systems Ltd v Attorney-General, above n 2, at [89]. Rouse v
Anzon Project No 5 Limited CA211/90, 30 May 1995.
135 Above n 2.
13 Ibid, at 635.
137 Above n 91.
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compromise is that neither side so regards it."' And the absence of a
protest can be explained away as indicative of the plaintiff's acceptance
that they had no choice but to agree.139
Similarly the absence of independent advice is not fatal and can be
discounted in various ways, for example by a finding that the plaintiff
did have the opportunity for independent advicel 40 , that the contract
was in the plaintiff's best interestsl 41 or that the plaintiff was aware of
all the options. Alternatively the presence of independent advice does
not preclude a finding of duress.142
In Pao On v Lau Yiu Long,143 the Court also suggested that whether
the plaintiff had an alternative choice open to him was relevant. This
is similar to the enquiry whether the plaintiff had a "practical choice".
But both enquiries really beg the question. What we do know is that a
finding of choice, even if that choice is "unpalatable" or "unattractive"
often tends to be fatal to the plaintiff's claim.'" Yet, it is rare for a plaintiff
to have no choice whatsoever. Even a plaintiff threatened with violence
has a choice - to go to the police. Nevertheless, in this situation failure to
go to the police does not preclude a finding of duress. So the availability
of choice does not appear to be the decisive, at least in all situations.
What can be observed is that the existence of choice becomes more
significant as the threat becomes palpably less unlawful. But even in
this situation the focus is not on the existence of choice per se but upon
the appropriateness of the alternative. As Tipping J observed in Attorney-
Generalfor England and Wales v R, "the nature of any alternatives reasonably
open to the plaintiff will be of major importance".141
Adam Opel GmbH v Mitras Automotive UK Ltd' 6 provides a recent
English illustration. Mitras supplied a vehicle bumper mount to Opel
for use on one of its vans. A facelift to the van's design meant that
the bumper mount was no longer required and Opel gave notice that
it would be terminating the supply agreement. Mitras threatened
to cease supplies (thereby bringing the assembly line to a halt after
approximately one day' 47) unless it received an increase in unit price
13 Ibid, at 102,215.
139 Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v International Transport Workers
Federation, above n 2, at 400 per Lord Scarman.
1o AE McDonald Ltd v Adams, above n 58; Shivas v Bank of New Zealand [1990]
2 NZLR 327 at 345.
141 Rouse v Anzon Project No 5 Limited CA211/90, 30 May 1995.
142 B & S Contracts and Design Ltd v Victor Green Publications [19841 ICR 419;
PAC Limited v Hamilton Heritage Limited, above n 16.
" [1980] AC 614.
'44 Attorney-General for England and Wales v R, above n 9, at [681; Hepworth
Heating Ltd v Akers, above n 64, at [21].
us5 Attorney-General for England and Wales v R, above n 9, at [62] (emphasis
added). See also McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd, above n 2, at [77] (was the
alternative a commercially reasonable one?).
146 Above n 6.
147 Unbeknown to Opel, one of its employees had been able to increase the
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and a compensation payment. Unsuccessful in its application to apply
for an injunction ex parte Opel agreed. In finding that there was duress
the court stressed Opel's "legitimate concern to ensure security of
supply"48 and downplayed the other option suggested as available to
it - applying for an injunction inter parties - as "worthy of admission to
Alice's wonderland". 4 9
From this review of the cases, what seems to be happening is that
a court's conclusion as to causation masks the operation of a number
of considerations involving ideas as to the nature of contractual (re)
negotiations, which are either omitted or not clearly listed in with the
factual summary of the defendant's actions that the plaintiff leads as
objectionable. Perhaps the most open statement of the court's approach is
contained in PAC Limited v Hamilton Heritage Limited.' In explaining the
'significant cause' test, Ward LJ, after drawing an analogy with "material
influence", suggests that the word "significant" is added:''
to emphasise the need for caution before finding economic duress is
established: it emphasises the need to distinguish tough, even ruthless,
negotiation which, whilst it may put pressure on a weaker party
to capitulate, nevertheless remains permissible, as opposed to the
illegitimate pressure which exceeds the bounds of commercial propriety.
Thus when considering choice the courts really are undertaking a final
review as to whether the pressure should be classified as improper, in
essence, reviewing the totality of enquiries 1 through 4 suggested here.
Nevertheless, a key consideration would appear to be whether the court
can perceive a legitimate commercial reason for the plaintiff entering
into the contract,'52 this has direct links with the courts' evaluation of
the contract's appropriateness.
An exception
There is one exception.' The exception arises when the court concludes
that the plaintiff's behaviour was such that he should be precluded
from challenging the appropriateness of the contract. The plaintiff may
be regarded as affirming the contract, for example by failing to "take
timely steps" to set aside the contract's and/ or by seeking to set aside
holding of bumper mounts to enable 48 hours of production, ibid, at
[31].
18 Ibid, at [331.
149 Ibid, at [32].
15 Above n 2.
151 ibid.
152 Pao On v Lau Yiu Long, above n 2.
1s3 This was recognised in Pao On v Lau Yiu Long, ibid, in the fourth of the
factors referred to above - "when did the plaintiff take steps to avoid the
contract?"
'54 McIntyre v Nemesis DBK Ltd, above n 2, at [99]-[100]. In that case
approximately 4 years had elapsed between entry into the variation and
the raising of the duress claim. Moreover, the claim of duress was raised
only after the death of the guiding force in the defendant company.
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part only of the contract.' 5 Alternatively the court may conclude that
the plaintiff is misusing the doctrine of duress.
A plaintiff may attempt to misuse the doctrine by choosing to enter into
a contract with the intention of obtaining the defendant's performance
before resorting to litigation. Associated with this are subsequent changes
of heart by plaintiffs who realise that there were better alternatives open
to them. AE McDonald Ltd v Adams"' illustrates both situations.
After agreeing to the compromise with Adams as to the cost of the
earthmoving works, and receiving the first of the scheduled payments,
McDonald consulted a solicitor and discovered that they could have
improved their bargaining position by placing a lien on the Adams
land."' Rather than seeking to repudiate the agreement at that time,
McDonald withheld action until they had received the last of the
scheduled payments. As described by the court, McDonald "set about
what, put baldly, was a course of deception, designed to secure payment
of the next instalment due in terms of the settlement."s5 8
IV. Conclusion
Claims of economic duress are hard to evaluate, especially in the
contractual variation situation. In the end, the result does turn on the
courts evaluation of the "distinctive features" 5 9 of the case rather that
a straightforward application of the general principle. This paper has
attempted to bridge the gap between the statements of general principle
as to what constitute duress and the results in particular cases. Its
main contribution is to identify an intermediary layer of analysis - the
following five enquiries:
1. whether the pressure can be described as 'improper' in these
circumstances;
2. whether there is a prior relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant;
3. whether the defendant's motivation in exerting the pressure can be
described as 'improper' in these circumstances;
4. whether the outcome is inappropriate, either because the contract
should not have been procured by these means or is intrinsically
unfair; and
5. whether the plaintiff felt sufficiently pressured to enter into a
contract which he or she might not otherwise have entered into.
In so doing it has shown how the classification of a particular pressure
in a particular situation turns on these enquiries. It also shows that
these enquiries are intertwined but that they do not necessarily produce
' Haines v Carter, above n 36.
156 Above n 58.
157 Ibid, at 102, 212.
'5 Ibid, at 102, 215.
159 CTN Cash and Carry Ltd v Gallaher Ltd, above n 2, at 717 (per Steyn LJ).
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consistent evaluations, for example a court may have sympathy for the
defendant's motivation in exerting the pressure yet ultimately conclude
that in those circumstances the pressure was improper. But in the end,
the case law suggests that a key consideration is whether the court views
the outcome of the pressure as inappropriate.
